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THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION AFTER THE FALL:
THE CASE FOR INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
RODNEY A. SMOLLA*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In City of Boerne v. Flores' the Supreme Court struck down
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 19932 (RFRA or the
"Act"), at least insofar as the Act is applied against state and
local governments.' For the moment, at least, free exercise cases
again are governed largely by the regime of Employment Division v. Smith,4 under which the Free Exercise Clause is not
deemed violated by laws of general applicability that happen to
place substantial burdens on religion. Several Justices in Flores,
however, again called for the Court to reconsider the principles
of Smith.5

Should the Court or Congress take up this challenge? Consider three options:
(1) After Flores, matters should be left to rest. The law (at
least with regard to state and local governments) has now
reverted to the rule of Smith. Smith should be accepted as
wisely decided, and its principle left to govern future con-

flicts.
(2) After Flores, Congress should try again. Smith, an un-

* Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary School

of Law.
1. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
3. Whether RFRA still survives as a valid law currently binding on the federal
government and its various agencies and instrumentalities is unclear.
4. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
5. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., joined in part by Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This
was not the first time members of the Court have called for a reexamination of
Smith. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
571-72 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at
577-78 (Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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wise decision, should be fought with all the resourcefulness
that Congress can muster. Congress should pass a new law,
"Son of RFRA." Using a combination of Congress's power to
attach conditions on the receipt of federal largess, Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce, and Congress's enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and bolstered by a more exhaustive legislative record
than that which supported the original enactment of RFRA, a
new federal statute should be passed that reaches most, if
not all, of the activities of state and local governments.
(3) Whatever Congress may attempt, the Supreme Court
should itself reconsider the Smith rule. Rather than approach
the issue posed by Smith as an "all-or-nothing" dilemma,
however, in which the choice is either the strict scrutiny test
or rational basis review, the Court should adopt the intermediate scrutiny standard.
This Essay explores the third option.
II. THE CASE FOR INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
The problem posed by Employment Division v. Smith and
RFRA, put simply, is this: What should the proper response be
to challenges brought against neutral laws of general applicability, broad proscriptions that were not enacted with religion in
mind and that do not mention or appear to concern religion, but
that nevertheless happen to place substantial burdens on an
individual's religious exercise? Suppose a local government passes a zoning law declaring that no more than four unrelated persons may reside in a residential dwelling. Five Buddhist monks,
unrelated by blood, inhabit a commodious home in a residential
neighborhood, where they live a contemplative life of physical
labor and meditation, comprising a small "wat," or monastery.
One day, zoning officials tell the five monks that in light of the
ordinance, one of them must leave. A minimum of five monks,
however, is necessary to perform most sacred Buddhist rituals,
and the departure of one monk will burden substantially their

6. Congress has already taken steps in this direction. See Linda Greenhouse,
Laws Are Urged to Protect Religion, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1997, at A15.
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free exercise of religion. Must the monks buckle to the zoning
law, or should they have some legally enforceable right to an
accommodation of their religious practices? If some legally enforceable right to accommodation should exist, then what should
its contours be?
Congress enacted RFRA in response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Smith, which involved a Free Exercise Clause claim
brought by members of the Native American Church who were
denied unemployment benefits after losing their jobs because
they had ingested peyote in small amounts as part of a sacramental ritual.' They challenged an Oregon criminal statute forbidding the use of peyote, claiming what was in substance a constitutional right to a religious exemption from an otherwise applicable criminal law.'
Prior to Smith, the cases seemed to contain two different and
opposing solutions to the issue. On the one hand, many decisions
appeared to support the view that the Free Exercise Clause did
not require exemption from the application of generally applicable laws. In Reynolds v. United States,9 for example, the Court
rejected the assertion that criminal laws forbidding polygamy
could not be constitutionally applied to persons who practiced
polygamy pursuant to religious command.' On the other hand,

7. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4); Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.

8. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874-75.
9. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
10. See id. at 166; see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)

(Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that the Free Exercise Clause does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a "valid and neutral law of general applicability"). The Court in Smith also quoted the words of Justice Frankfurter in
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940):

Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for
religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general

law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The
mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant con-

cerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge
of political responsibilities.

Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (footnote omitted) (quoting Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594-95). The
Court's quote from Gobitis was arguably ill-conceived overkill, because in Gobitis the
Supreme Court applied Justice Frankfurter's theory to sustain a school board's power
to discipline a Jehovah's Witness child for failing to salute the American flag. See
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 600. Gobitis remained good law for only three years. It was

overruled by West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
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a number of Supreme Court decisions had appeared to support
the principle that laws substantially burdening a religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and
be narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest. A series of cases
involving government benefits such as unemployment compensation, emanating from Sherbert v. Verner," seemed to require
the application of the strict scrutiny standard even to neutral
laws of general applicability that only "indirectly" burdened religion. 12 In Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist was discharged by
her private employer because she would not work on Saturday,
the Sabbath Day of her faith."3 No law commanded the claimant to do that which was forbidden by her religion, or forbid her
from doing that which her religion commanded.' 4
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment could be violated even when the burden at issue was only
"indirect:"
But this is only the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry. For
"[ilf the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance
of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between
religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the
burden may be characterized as being only indirect." 5
The Supreme Court in Smith resolved this split by opting for
the line of precedent typified by Reynolds, holding that the Free

(1943), in which Justice Jackson wrote the famous lines: "If there is any fixed star

in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Id. at 642. Where

Gobitis went wrong was in failing to see a distinction between "obedience to a general law" when that law proscribes only action, such as polygamy, or as in Smith,

ingestion of a drug, and obedience to a law requiring the affirmative profession of
beliefs, political or religious.
11. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
12. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834-35 (1989);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 140 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).

13. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399.
14. See id. at 403.
15. Id. at 403-04 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
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Exercise Clause imposed no heightened constitutional burdens
on government when it sought merely to enforce neutral and
generally applicable laws.16 "[G]overnment's ability to enforce
generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct,"
the Court argued, "'cannot depend on measuring the effects of a
governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development.' To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law
contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs,
except where the State's interest is 'compelling'.

.

. contradicts

sense."17

both constitutional tradition and common
The Court did not overrule the opposing line of precedent,
however, but instead sought to distinguish it on the grounds
that the cases in that line did not involve "the Free Exercise
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with
other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and
of the press ...

or the right of parents ... to direct the educa-

tion of their children." 8 In contrast, the Court in Smith explained, the case before it did "not present such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right." 9 This attempt to reconcile these
two lines of precedent was restated matter-of-factly in Fores, as
the Court summarized its ruling in Smith."° As to Sherbert v.
Verner and its progeny, the Court in Smith attempted to cabin
those cases within the principle that "where the State has in

16. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
17. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)).
18. Id. at 881 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating school
attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to
send their children to school); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944)
(striking down a flat tax on solicitation as applied to dissemination of religious literature); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (same); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940) (striking a permit requirement for solicitation of
contributions as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses distributing religious literature);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a law requiring children to attend public schools rather than private schools)).
19. Id.
20. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2161 (1997) ("e only instances
where a neutral, generally applicable law had failed to pass constitutional muster,
the Smith Court noted, were cases in which other constitutional protections were at
stake.").
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place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to
extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason. " "
The Court's handling of prior precedent in Smith was not
particularly satisfying. There is first the "hybrid right" business,
and the question of why it should matter that a claim implicates
more than one fundamental right, as if the Constitution were
limited to two-for-one sales. The Court in Smith gave absolutely
no reasons as to why the strict scrutiny test should be triggered
only when a free exercise claim is coupled with some other constitutional claim. Is there some sort of constitutional chemistry
at work, some sort of synergy created by the combination of
ingredients, so that the free exercise claim, when joined with a
privacy or free speech claim somehow activates an otherwise
inert clause? Or was the Court in Smith saying something even
simpler-that the Free Exercise Clause has no appreciable power of its own, at least in the absence of laws that especially target religion for discriminatory treatment? Perhaps prior cases
that seemed to be grounded in the Free Exercise Clause simply
were not really religion cases at all, but cases based on other
rights, in which the subject matter just happened to involve
religious issues.
This explanation, more expansive than any the Court itself
actually gave, is plausible for some of the precedents the Court
sought to explain away. For example, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,22 striking down a requirement that children attend a public school, was decided and explained on substantive due process
grounds. 2' Although a majority of private schools then and now
are affiliated with religious groups, the right to send children to
private schools could be vindicated with no mention of the Free
Exercise Clause at all. So too, the flat tax on the dissemination
of information, struck down in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,2 happened to have been applied to literature distributed by Jehovah's

21. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
22. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
23. See id. at 519-21.
24. 319 U.S. 105 (1943); see also Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573,
577-78 (1944) (striking a tax on solicitation as applied to dissemination of religious
literature).
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Witnesses," but easily could have been seen as a violation of
the Speech Clause and its prohibitions on prior restraints.
Cantwell v. Connecticut,26 however, is a somewhat tougher
sell. Yes, Cantwell in theory might be explained entirely in free
speech terms. The Connecticut law at issue stated that no person could solicit money, services, subscriptions, or any valuable
thing for any alleged "religious, charitable or philanthropic
cause" without a permit from the Secretary of the Welfare Council." To obtain a permit, the Secretary had to determine
"whether such cause is a religious one or is a bona fide object of
charity or philanthropy and conforms to reasonable standards of
efficiency and integrity."' The law was thus a prior restraint,
empowering the official in charge of issuing the license to grant
or deny permission on the basis of relatively standardless subjective judgments.29 Indeed, subsequent cases, applying only
the Speech Clause, have struck down such standardless prior restraints,"0 as well as various requirements imposing restrictions on how charities are organized or financed as a precondition to permitting solicitation.3
Cantwell is thus understandable as a free speech case in
which the expression happened to be religious. There was no
necessary reason for the Cantwell Court to invoke the Free Exercise Clause at all, but the Court did. If one looks at what

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106-07.
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Id. at 301-02.
Id. at 302.
See id. at 304-05.
See Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 964 n.12

(1984) ("By placing discretion in the hands of an official to grant or deny a license,
such a statute creates a threat of censorship that by its very existence chills free
speech."); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 292-95 (1951) (striking down a law re-

quiring persons wishing to conduct religious service to obtain a permit from the police commissioner when the statute contained no standards to guide exercise of discretion). See generally 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF

SPEECH §§ 6:14-:16 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing the vagueness doctrine and its application to cases involving grants of unbridled administrative discretion to officials
charged with the administration of laws regulating speech).
31. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 63840 (1980) (striking down an ordinance prohibiting solicitation of contributions by

charitable organizations that do not use at least 75% of their receipts for "charitable purposes").
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Cantwell said, as opposed to how it might later be deconstructed
and reconstructed, then it was primarily a religion case. Although the Court did indeed find the prior restraint elements of
the Connecticut law obnoxious, it consistently referred to the
law as a previous restraint on the free exercise of religion. 2
The core of the Court's holding, and the bulk of the language
throughout the opinion, was articulated in free exercise terms,
though at times the Court did appear to invoke both free speech
and free exercise guarantees. 3' At no point in Cantwell, however, was there even the remotest hint that the constitutional
principle being enforced was dependent on the existence of a
"hybrid" claim bridging two First Amendment rights.
Wisconsin v. Yoder34 can be explained only as a free exercise
case. The Court in Yoder held that Wisconsin could not enforce
its compulsory school attendance law to require members of the
Amish Mennonite Church to send their fourteen- and fifteenyear-old children to Wisconsin public schools.35 The Court articulated its ruling entirely in Free Exercise Clause terms.3 6
More importantly, Yoder is distinguished by its extended discussion of whether the objections the Amish had to sending their
children to school were genuinely religious in nature, or were
instead based on the nonreligious elements of the Amish "way of
life."W The Amish claimed the two were essentially inseparable. 3' But the Supreme Court delved more deeply into the mat32. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 305 ("Such a censorship of religion as the means of
determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment . .

").

33. See, e.g., id. at 308 ("Equally obvious is it that a State may not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving
desirable conditions.") (emphasis added).
34. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
35. See id. at 234.
36. See id. at 214. The Court stated:

It follows that in order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance
beyond the eighth grade against a claim that such attendance interferes
with the practice of a legitimate religious belief, it must appear either
that the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its
requirement, or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to
override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.
Id.
37. Id. at 210-13.
38. See id. at 215. The Court stated:
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ter, making it clear that the success of the constitutional claim
asserted by the Amish was dependent on it being grounded in
religion, as opposed to a mere philosophical belief, such as the
teachings of Henry David Thoreau:
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be
interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have
the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be
rooted in religious belief. Although a determination of what is
a "religious" belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to
make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests. Thus, if the Amish
asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation
and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by
the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of
his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims
would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was
philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such
belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.39
Only after assuring itself that the claims of the Amish were
authentically religious in nature did the Court hold that those
religious beliefs trumped the interests of the state of Wisconsin
in enforcing its compulsory attendance laws.4 ° Yoder is thus

We come then to the quality of the claims of the respondents concerning the alleged encroachment of Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance statute on their rights and the rights of their children to the free
exercise of the religious beliefs they and their forebears have adhered to
for almost three centuries. In evaluating those claims we must be careful
to determine whether the Amish religious faith and their mode of life
are, as they claim, inseparable and interdependent.

Id.
39. Id. at 215-16 (footnote omitted); see also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,
83 (1944) (stating that religious doctrines cannot be subjected to findings of "truth or
falsity").
40. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216-17. The Court stated:
Giving no weight to such secular considerations, however, we see
that the record in this case abundantly supports the claim that the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal prefer-

934

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:925

unintelligible as a free speech or substantive due process claim.
If the Amish parents merely had asserted a right to have their
philosophical beliefs vindicated under the Free Speech Clause,
or their rights to direct the education of their own children vindicated under the Due Process Clause, then the Court would
have rejected their claim.4' The injection of religious belief
made all the difference. Additionally, the Court in Yoder clearly
thought that it made enough of a difference to require striking
down application of the Wisconsin law even though the law was
both of "general applicability" 2 and ostensibly "neutral."43 As

ence, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group,
and intimately related to daily living. That the Old Order Amish daily
life and religious practice stem from their faith is shown by the fact that
it is in response to their literal interpretation of the Biblical injunction
from the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, "be not conformed to this world
....
" This command is fundamental to the Amish faith. Moreover, for
the Old Order Amish, religion is not simply a matter of theocratic belief.
As the expert witnesses explained, the Old Order Amish religion pervades and determines virtually their entire way of life, regulating it with
the detail of the Talmudic diet through the strictly enforced rules of the
church community.
The record shows that the respondents' religious beliefs and attitude
toward life, family, and home have remained constant-perhaps some
would say static-in a period of unparalleled progress in human knowledge generally and great changes in education. The respondents freely
concede, and indeed assert as an article of faith, that their religious beliefs and what we would today call "life style" have not altered in fundamentals for centuries. Their way of life in a church-oriented community,
separated from the outside world and "worldly" influences, their attachment to nature and the soil, is a way inherently simple and uncomplicated, albeit difficult to preserve against the pressure to conform. Their rejection of telephones, automobiles, radios, and television, their mode of
dress, of speech, their habits of manual work do indeed set them apart
from much of contemporary society; these customs are both symbolic and
practical.
Id. (footnote omitted).
41. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
42. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220. The Court stated:
But to agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to
the broad police power of the State is not to deny that there are areas
of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability.
Id. (citations omitted).
43. Id. The Court stated:
Nor can this case be disposed of on the grounds that Wisconsin's
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significant as Wisconsin's interests in enforcing its laws may
have been, they were not persuasive enough for the Court in
Yoder, and the Court's almost nostalgic Americana sympathy for
the uncomplicated and virtuous life of the Amish people."
If the Smith Court's insistence that prior cases could be explained as hybrid constitutional claims appeared disingenuous,
its argument that the Sherbert line of cases was distinguishable
on the principle that "where the State has in place a system of
individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system
to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason " " was
equally lame. This interpretation of Sherbert actually began to

requirement for school attendance to age 16 applies uniformly to all citizens of the State and does not, on its face, discriminate against religions
or a particular religion, or that it is motivated by legitimate secular concerns. A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it
unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.
Id.
44. See id. at 217-18. The Court's sympathy is evident in the following passage:
As the society around the Amish has become more populous, urban,
industrialized, and complex, particularly in this century, government regulation of human affairs has correspondingly become more detailed and
pervasive. The Amish mode of life has thus come into conflict increasingly with requirements of contemporary society exerting a hydraulic insistence on conformity to majoritarian standards. So long as compulsory education laws were confined to eight grades of elementary basic education
imparted in a nearby rural schoolhouse, with a large proportion of students of the Amish faith, the Old Order Amish had little basis to fear
that school attendance would expose their children to the worldly influence they reject. But modem compulsory secondary education in rural
areas is now largely carried on in a consolidated school, often remote
from the student's home and alien to his daily home life. As the record
so strongly shows, the values and programs of the modem secondary
school are in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated
by the Amish religion; modem laws requiring compulsory secondary education have accordingly engendered great concern and conflict. The conclusion is inescapable that secondary schooling, by exposing Amish children to worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and values contrary to beliefs, and by substantially interfering with the religious development of the Amish child and his integration into the way of life of the
Amish faith community at the crucial adolescent stage of development,
contravenes the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith,
both as to the parent and the child.
Id.
45. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
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take hold four years before Smith in Bowen v. Roy.46 The Court
in Bowen rejected the argument that the Sherbert line of cases
required a state welfare agency, in administering AFDC and
food stamp payments, to accommodate the religious convictions
of Native Americans who objected to the assignment of a Social
Security number to their two-year old daughter, Little Bird of
the Snow, because the assignment of such a number would destroy her uniqueness and rob her spirit." The Court distinguished the unemployment compensation holdings in Sherbert
and Thomas v. Review Board48 on the theory that the system of
unemployment benefits, which disqualified claimants if they had
quit their jobs without good cause, in effect discriminated
against religion if it refused to credit a religious reason as good
cause.49 The Bowen argument, seized upon in Smith and restated in Mores,' ° cannot be convincingly squared with the facts or
language of Sherbert. That case contained no suggestion of discrimination against Adell Sherbert or her Seventh-Day
Adventist faith unless we are to read surreptitious animus into
the record on the mere fact that it was a Saturday that she
claimed as her Sabbath. On its face, the South Carolina law was
flat, neutral, and generally applicable. Nothing suggested that
the state would have grantedAdell Sherbert an exemption if she
had claimed her Sabbath to be on Sunday, or that the state
would have granted her an exemption if she had said she could
not work on Saturdays because that was the day on which she
committed to participate in a Henry David Thoreau reading
group.5 As Justice Harlan pointed out, South Carolina was
merely unwilling to grant unemployment compensation to persons who were able-bodied but for personal reasons, religious or
otherwise, refused to work on a given day.5"
46. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
47. See id. at 696.
48. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
49. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 708 ("If a state creates such a mechanism, its refusal
to extend an exemption to an instance of religious hardship suggests a discriminatory intent .... [T]o consider a religiously motivated resignation to be 'Without good
cause' tends to exhibit hostility, not neutrality, towards religion.").
50. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2161 (1997).
51. Cf. text accompanying note 39 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 21516 (1972)).
52. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 419 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating
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Moreover, if the "system of exemptions" caveat to Smith is
taken seriously, it cuts a potentially large loophole into the Smith
ruling. Most zoning regimes, for example, have a special use permit procedure that allows exemptions, on a case-by-case and
individualized basis, from the municipality's general zoning
scheme.5 3 Would the refusal of a zoning board to grant a special
use permit to a church or Buddhist temple claiming religious
hardship thus trigger the Smith "exemption exception?" If Bowen
and Smith are accepted at face value, the answer should be "yes."
The existence of such a system would take the case out from under the rule of Smith and back within the rule of Sherbert.
The point of this exercise is to demonstrate that Smith took a
perplexing problem and two conflicting lines of precedent and
resolved the problem and the conflict in a manner that was superficial and unconvincing. It would behoove the Court to try
again. The landmark principle enshrined in Smith was announced without briefing or oral argument.' The Smith principle is, as both the enactment of RFRA and the public response
to the Court's ruling in Mores attest,5 5 a source of intense political disquiet. Several Justices have questioned the soundness of
Smith, often making the eminently reasonable point that a rule
of such profound moment merits full-dress examination before
permanent entrenchment. 6
If Smith is reconsidered, then it ought to be revised. In place
of its stark rule, the flexible standard of intermediate judicial
scrutiny should be adopted. Laws of general applicability that
place substantial burdens on the free exercise of religion should
be justified by substantial governmental interests and should be
narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.
Intermediate scrutiny has proven to be a useful doctrinal ve-

that the South Carolina Supreme Court "has consistently held that one is not 'available for work' if his unemployment has resulted not from the inability of industry to
provide a job but rather from personal circumstances, no matter how compelling").
53. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 6.53-.61 (3d ed. 1993).
54. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2186 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting).
55. See Greenhouse, supra note 6, at A15.
56. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 921 (1990) (Blackmun, J., joined
by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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hicle in other areas of constitutional law,57 and in the religion
area it would strike an appropriate balance between the
government's interest in the uniform adherence to laws of general applicability and the interest of individuals in receiving modest accommodation for the free exercise of religious beliefs. Most
significantly, intermediate scrutiny is used in free speech cases
in which "neutral" laws nevertheless place burdens on expression.5" Adoption of an intermediate scrutiny standard would
thus work no novel or arbitrary departure from the architecture
of First Amendment doctrine, but would instead bring principles
governing the freedom of religion into sensible synchronization
with the principles governing freedom of speech.
The Court in Smith, as already noted, alluded to other constitutional provisions in undertaking its analysis, announcing its
"hybrid right" theory.59 The Court was right to look at other
clauses, but it looked at them the wrong way. The problem
posed by Smith is not unique to Religion Clause cases but has
parallels in other areas of constitutional law as various as equal
protection, freedom of speech and press, and even the Dormant
Commerce Clause.
Starting with the most mundane, consider Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. State laws that discriminate against interstate
commerce are regarded generally as invalid per se.6" In contrast, when a state statute regulates in-state and out-of-state
commerce evenhandedly, and its negative effects on interstate
commerce are only "incidental," the Court applies a balancing
test.6 In applying this balancing test, the formulation of which
is quite close to "intermediate scrutiny," the Court engages in a
moderately searching review,62 largely attempting to determine
57. See infra notes 60-79 and accompanying text.
58. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1967) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to content-neutral speech regulation); infra notes 72-75 and accompanying
text.
59. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-28 (1978) (strik-

ing down ban on importation of out-of-state garbage); see also Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359-60 (1992)
(same); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 339-42 (1992) (holding that a higher fee for the disposal of out-of-state waste is unconstitutional).
61. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
62. See id. The Court stated:
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if the statute at issue serves such interests as environmental
protection or public health, or is, in reality, parochial legislation
designed to promote or enhance local business at the expense of
out-of-state enterprises. 63
In equal protection cases, the norm is that heightened judicial
scrutiny is not triggered unless there is purposeful discrimination against a suspect or quasi-suspect class." The classic explanation for this principle is that laws employing suspect criteria such as race or gender are inherently more odious and dangerous than neutral laws.65 Race-conscious laws, for example,
will rarely be justifiable on legitimate grounds, but race-neutral
laws are likely to have legitimate functions despite their adverse
impact on some racial groups." The downside to the purposeful
discrimination requirement is that it makes ferreting out unconscious racism or sexism more difficult.6"
In speech and press cases, the doctrine is somewhat more confused. A line of cases involving the press appears to endorse the
principle that the press enjoys no special First Amendment exemption from the coverage of generally applicable laws. In Cohen
v. Cowles Media Co.,'a for example, the Court refused to engraft a
First Amendment defense onto a promissory estoppel claim
brought against a newspaper that violated a promise of confiden-

Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted
as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id. (citation omitted).
63. See id.; see also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148-51 (1986) (affirming findings
of a legitimate local purpose served by Maine's ban on live baitfish importation).
64. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272-73 (1979); Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
65. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 559 (1977).
66. See id. at 559-60.
67. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-23 (1987).
68. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
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tiality it had granted to a source. 69 The Court stated that "generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on
its ability to gather and report the news."7" Similarly, cases involving taxes on the press generally appear to track Equal Protection Clause analysis, sustaining taxes that are generally applicable, but striking down taxes that single out the press, or any subset of it, for disadvantageous tax treatment.7 1
In contrast to these press cases, however, free speech law is
governed largely by a different test, that imposed by United
States v. O'Brien.72 In O'Brien, the Court applied an intermediate scrutiny standard when a law "unrelated to the suppression
of free expression" caused an "incidental restriction" on free expression." O'Brien is a workhorse of contemporary First
Amendment law, applied constantly by courts to subject neutral
laws of general applicability that nevertheless adversely impact
on speech to intermediate scrutiny review.74 Under the O'Brien
test:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free ex-

69. See id. at 669-70.
70. Id. at 669; see also Citizen Pub'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138-40
(1969) (sustaining application of antitrust laws to the press); Oklahoma Press Publ'g
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1946) (sustaining application of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to the press); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-23
(1945) (sustaining application of antitrust laws to the press); Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 120-21 (1937) (sustaining application of the National Labor
Relations Act to the press).
71. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575, 581-85 (1983); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250
(1936). The Court has applied the same principle in the religion context. See Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 389-92 (1990) (sustaining generally applicable sales tax even as applied to religious books and merchandise). In Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991), the Court seemed to compromise these principles, holding that a sales tax was constitutional even though it applied to only certain segments of the media. See id. at 447.
72. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
73. Id. at 377.
74. See generally 1 SMOLLA, supra note 30, §§ 9:1-:17 (discussing the application of
the O'Brien standard).
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pression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. 5
The Court similarly applies "intermediate scrutiny" in speech
cases to most other content-neutral regulations of speech, such
as "time, place, or manner" regulations.7 6 Even the well-established intermediate scrutiny standards of the O'Brien and content-neutrality doctrines, however, are not always applicable. In
Wisconsin v. Mitchell,7 for example, a unanimous Supreme
Court held that the First Amendment was not triggered at all by
a law that enhanced the penalty for crimes committed out of
racial bias when the principal evidence of that bias was hateful
words uttered by the criminal.78 The mere evidentiary use of
speech to establish intent, the Court held, did not penalize expression, but merely used it to establish an underlying element
of the crime.79
What is the point of this potpourri? At the very least, it demonstrates that there is no inexorable force to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Smith. Under current doctrine, nondiscriminatory laws are handled in different ways under different constitutional clauses. Indeed, sometimes they are handled in different
ways under the same clause. The application of some level of
review higher than the deferential rational basis standard to
neutral laws of general applicability that substantially burden
religion would not run contrary to all constitutional tradition
and common sense. Rather, it is the kind of thing we do all the
time. If it's good enough for the Commerce Clause, then it's good
enough for me.
Purely as a matter of doctrine scrivening, the question might
be put just this simply: Why has Free Exercise jurisprudence

75. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
76. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
77. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
78. See id. at 488-90.
79. See id at 489. The Court thus distinguished R.A.V. u. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377 (1992), in which the Court had struck down a "hate speech" law on the
grounds that the law engaged in impermissible content-based and viewpoint-based
discrimination. See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487.
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never evolved its own version of the O'Brien test? If we apply
intermediate scrutiny to laws that incidentally burden speech,
then why not to laws that incidentally burden religion?"
The creation of an O'Brien test for free exercise cases has several advantages. First, by bringing free exercise cases into a parity with speech cases, the problem of distinguishing when expression or conduct is religiously motivated and when it's not
would disappear. The Wisconsin v. Yoder conundrum, in which
we must determine whether an objector's problem with a law is
truly religious or merely philosophical, s ' would evaporate. Neutral laws of general applicability that burden either religious or
philosophical expression or beliefs would be equally protected. 2
Second, this approach would mitigate and perhaps entirely mute
the objection to the Sherbert strict scrutiny approach originally
made by Justice Harlan and echoed most recently in Flores by
Justice Stevens. This is the claim that granting a special accommodation for religion actually violates the Establishment Clause.
This was Justice Harlan's point in his Sherbert dissent," and
Justice Stevens echoed the theme in his short concurrence in
Flores. For if governments were constitutionally required to
justify incidental restrictions that substantially burden First
Amendment rights by meeting the standards of intermediate
scrutiny, then religion would not be singled out for specially advantageous treatment, but would rather be given the same modestly enhanced protection that applies to all burdens on belief,
whatever their source.

80. This proposal would apply with equal force to press cases, such as Cohen,
which also should be subjected to at least intermediate scrutiny. See supra notes 6870 and accompanying text. The editorial decision to expose a duplicitous confidential
source ought to be granted at least some enhanced First Amendment protection beyond the unvarnished law of contracts and promissory estoppel. These issues, however, are beyond the purview of this Essay.
81. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
82. The Supreme Court has already shown a tendency to move in this direction in
the military draft cases, interpreting conscientious objector provisions in a manner
that all but erases the distinction between religion and philosophy. See Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
83. See Sherbert v. Veruer, 374 U.S. 398, 422-23 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
84. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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III. CONCLUSION

Those who do not like doctrine do not like intermediate scrutiny, for it simply adds to the complexity and artificiality of constitutional law. Intermediate scrutiny tests, whether applied
under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, or the
Commerce Clause, are always the stuff of compromise. The
Court adopts intermediate review when it is not willing to relegate the constitutional policy issues at stake entirely to legislative judgment, but when it believes that there are sufficiently
persuasive justifications for legislative activity in an area where
the highly intrusive strict scrutiny review is not warranted.
Compromise is not always bad, however. In many areas of constitutional law, intermediate scrutiny has proven to be a perfectly serviceable judicial tool, employed with reasonable stability and predictability by lower courts as a body of law grows in
an area by accretion over time. Intermediate scrutiny would be a
sensible compromise to the balance of competing interests posed
by Smith and RFRA and would bring religion and speech jurisprudence into a synchronization that would promote the logical
evolution of the law in both fields.

